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The notion that there is a ‘social brain’ in humans specialized for social interactions has received
considerable support from brain imaging and, to a lesser extent, from lesion studies. Specific roles for
the various components of the social brain are beginning to emerge. For example, the amygdala
attaches emotional value to faces, enabling us to recognize expressions such as fear and
trustworthiness, while the posterior superior temporal sulcus predicts the end point of the complex
trajectories created when agents act upon the world. It has proved more difficult to assign a role to
medial prefrontal cortex, which is consistently activated when people think about mental states.
I suggest that this region may have a special role in the second-order representations needed for
communicative acts when we have to represent someone else’s representation of our own mental
state. These cognitive processes are not specifically social, since they can be applied in other domains.
However, these cognitive processes have been driven to ever higher levels of sophistication by the
complexities of social interaction.
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In her seminal review, Brothers (1990) proposed that
there was a circumscribed set of brain regions that were
dedicated to social cognition. She called this set of
regions the social brain and listed amygdala, orbital
frontal cortex and temporal cortex as its major
components. The evidence for her proposal came
largely from studies of monkeys. After lesions to the
amygdala, monkeys become socially isolated (Kling &
Brothers 1992) and lesions to orbital frontal cortex can
also alter social behaviour (Raleigh & Steklis 1981).
Neurons in the superior temporal sulcus respond to
aspects of faces such as expression and gaze direction
(Perrett et al. 1992). With the advent of brain imaging,
it has become possible to study social brain in human
volunteers. Brothers’ conjecture has stood up well to
this barrage of new evidence (e.g. Adolphs 2003).
However, there have been two major additions to the
list of social brain regions. First, the medial prefrontal
cortex and the adjacent paracingulate cortex have been
consistently implicated in studies where participants
have to think about mental states (Amodio & Frith
2006). Second, a ‘mirror’ system has been found in the
brain of monkeys and humans, which allows us, to
some extent, to share the experiences of others
(Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). In this essay, I shall
briefly review the evidence concerning the mirror
system and the four specific brain regions considered
to have a role in social cognition: (i) the posterior
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and the adjacent
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), (ii) the amygdala, (iii)
the temporal poles, and (iv) the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC) and the adjacent anterior cingulatentribution of 19 to a Dicussion Meeting Issue ‘Social
nce: from brain to culture’.
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these various systems and consider to what extent their
functions are specifically social.(a) What is the social brain for?
But first, I must consider what the social brain is for. It
is the social brain that allows us to interact with other
people. As with all our interactions with the world, we
can do much better if we can predict what is going to
happen next. The better we can predict what someone
is going to do next, the more successful our interactions
with that person will be. I shall argue that the function
of the social brain is to enable us to make predictions
during social interactions. These predictions need not
be conscious and deliberated. For example, classical
Pavlovian conditioning allows us to anticipate what will
happen after a conditioned stimulus. Such basic
conditioning has social relevance if the conditioned
stimulus is a face with a certain expression.(b) Prediction in social interactions
Perhaps the most important attribute of the social
brain is that it allows us to make predictions about
people’s actions on the basis of their mental states.
This assumption that behaviour is caused by mental
states has been called taking an ‘intentional stance’
(Dennett 1987) or ‘having a theory of mind’
(Premack & Woodruff 1978). The largely automatic
process by which we ‘read’ the mental states of others
is called mentalizing.
There are many different types of mental states that
can affect our behaviour. There are long-term disposi-
tions: one person may be trustworthy while another is
unreliable. There are short-term emotional states like
fear and anger. There are desires like thirst which lead
to specific goal-directed behaviours. There are the
beliefs that we have about the world which determineThis journal is q 2007 The Royal Society
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672 C. D. Frith The social brain?our behaviour even when they are false. For example,
I will look in my bookcase for a book that is not there if
someone has borrowed it without telling me. Finally,
there is the rather special intention to communicate
with others, and the associated ability to recognize that
certain behaviours are communicative.2. THE ROLE OF THE AMYGDALA
One of the unexpected results from early brain imaging
studies was the fragmentation of emotion. There is no
single brain system dedicated to emotion. Rather, each
emotion has its own specific system. For example, fear
is associated with activity in the amygdala (Morris et al.
1998), while disgust is associated with activity in the
insular (Phillips et al. 1997). In these examples, the
activity was elicited, not by the emotion directly, but by
observing the expression of the emotion in a face.
Thus, through its role in recognizing expressions such
as fear, the amygdala has a role in social interactions.(a) Prejudice
But this is not its only role. The amygdala is also
activated by presentation of faces rated as untrust-
worthy (Winston et al. 2002). This is an example of
prejudice since the faces were of people unknown to the
participants in the experiment. Race prejudice has been
studied in a number of imaging paradigms and
amygdala activation has been consistently found in
association with the unconscious fear that is elicited by
viewing the face of someone from another race. When
white Americans were shown the faces of unknown
black Americans, activity was observed in the amygdala
(Phelps et al. 2000). The magnitude of the activity in
the amygdala correlated with implicit measures of race
prejudice. However, amygdala damage does not
remove race prejudice (Phelps et al. 2003), and
amygdala response magnitude does not correlate with
explicit measures of race prejudice. Our consciously
held attitudes about race are often at variance with our
implicit prejudices and there is evidence that we try to
suppress these rapid automatic responses. The amyg-
dala response to black faces was reduced when the faces
were presented for 525 ms rather than 30 ms and,
associated with this reduction, there was increased
activity in areas of frontal cortex concerned with
control and regulation (Cunningham et al. 2004).(b) Prejudice and conditioning
Race prejudice is an example of stereotyping: associating
mental attributes with a group of people and then
applying this prejudice to individual members of
that group. The amygdala is involved in this process
owing to its role in fear conditioning. Extensive research
with animals has shown that the amygdala is part of a
system that learns to associate value with stimuli (Dolan
2002), whether or not these stimuli are social (LeDoux
2000). This system operates on both positive and
negative values. For example, the amygdala responds to
objects that elicit fear owing to their association with
punishment (negative value), but the amygdala also
responds to objects associated with food and sex
(positive value).Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2007)In the experiments on race prejudice, the amygdala
is responding to black faces in the same way as it
responds to any object that has acquired a conditioned
fear response (Buchel et al. 1998). The role of the
amygdala in recognizing expressions of fear most
probably has the same origin. A fearful expression is a
signal (the conditioned stimulus) that there is some-
thing fearful near at hand (the unconditioned stimu-
lus), so that a fearful face will eventually elicit a fear
response. The amygdala is involved in social cognition
owing to its role in associating the value (positive or
negative) with individual objects and classes of object.
This system applies to people just as it does to objects.
Our long-term prejudices about individuals and groups
are built up through a conditioning process involving
the amygdala, but this process is not specifically social.3. TEMPORAL POLES
(a) Social scripts
Through experience, we build up a rich store of
knowledge about the world (Schank & Abelson 1977)
that is important for our ability to mentalize. We learn
facts about specific people: what they look like, where
they live, whether they are trustworthy and so on. We also
learn facts about social situations: the moment-to-
moment changes in behaviour appropriate to the
situations in which people frequently find themselves
and also how feelings and dispositions affect the
behaviour of people in these situations. Damage to the
temporal poles can impair the ability to use this
knowledge (Funnell 2001). This observation is consist-
ent with the suggestion that the temporal poles are
convergence zones, where simpler features from different
modalities are brought together to define, by their
conjunction, unique individuals and situations (Damasio
et al. 2004). Through this convergence of information,
our understanding of an object can be modified by the
context in which it appears (Ganis & Kutas 2003). These
processes instantiated in the temporal poles are import-
ant for mentalizing. They allow us to apply our general
knowledge about social situations to the situation that
currently confronts us. They specify the kinds of thoughts
and feelings most likely to occur in a particular context,
e.g. the pride or embarrassment that we have felt or
observed in similar situations in the past. But, of course,
situations are never exactly repeated. There is much to be
learned by observing the moment-to-moment changes in
expression and behaviour in the person we are interacting
with. This is the role for the brain’s mirror system.4. THE BRAIN’S MIRROR SYSTEM
(a) A Bayesian approach to mentalizing
Our social brain has two problems to solve. First, it
must read the mental state of the person we are
interacting with. Second, it must make predictions
about future behaviour on the basis of that mental
state. From a Bayesian perspective, these two problems
are not independent. The error in my prediction of
future behaviour indicates how good my reading of the
mental state was and enables me to make a better
estimate of that mental state. In principle, the same
mechanism can be used for reading mental states as for
reading hidden states of the world outside the social
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I have to estimate how heavy it is. On the basis of this
estimate, I can initiate the appropriate grasping
behaviour and predict the consequences of my action.
If my estimation of the hidden state of the coffee pot is
wrong, my prediction will be incorrect. For example, if
the pot is lighter than I expected, then my hand will
move up faster than I expected. This error tells me that
the coffee pot is lighter. Wolpert et al. (2003) have
outlined how such an action system could provide the
basis for reading the hidden intentions of others during
action observation (see also Wilson & Knoblich 2005).
One problem for the Bayesian mechanism I have
outlined is for it to get started. Where does the initial
estimate of mental state come from? I suggest that this
problem can be solved by the brain’s mirror system.
Since Gallese (2007) will be discussing this system in
detail in his contribution to this issue, my comments
will be brief and will emphasize my particular view.
(b) Mirroring emotions and actions
The idea that there is a mirror system in the brain arises
from the observation that the same brain areas are
activated when we observe another person experiencing
an emotion as when we experience the same emotion
ourselves (e.g. Wicker et al. 2003). The brain’s mirror
system is engaged by actions as well as emotions and,
indeed, it was this aspect of the system that was first
identified (for a recent review, see Rizzolatti & Craighero
2004). Motor areas of the brain become active when we
observe others moving, and also we tend to imitate the
movements of others automatically (Chartrand & Bargh
1999), even when this interferes with our own actions
(Kilner et al. 2003). The mirror system also operates for
touch and for pain. Somatosensory brain regions are
activated when we see someone else being touched
(Keysers et al. 2004; Blakemore et al. 2005). Pain areas
in the brain become active when we see someone
receiving a painful stimulus (Morrison et al. 2004;
Jackson et al. 2005) or even when a symbolic cue tells us
that someone is receiving pain (Singer et al. 2004).
These mirror effects can occur for auditory as well as
visual cues (Kohler et al. 2002).
The brain’s mirror system is not tied to any particular
brain region. The location of the activation will depend
upon what is being observed. Underpinning the mirror
system, there must be some rather general mechanism
by which sensory or symbolic cues can be converted into
covert actions. One possibility is that the brain
represents actions in the same way, whether perceiving
them or planning them (the common coding principle;
Prinz 1997). Such a representation does not specify who
is performing the action and would be accessed when
both perceiving and performing an action.
(c) Contagion: a first step in mentalizing
Whatever the mechanism, the result is that actions are
contagious. When we see someone smiling, we will
automatically imitate that smile and feel happier
ourselves. Through this mechanism, we can experience
the emotional states of another person. I believe this
phenomenon supplies the first step in mentalizing, i.e.
the initial estimate of the mental state of the person we
are interacting with. However, experiencing the samePhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2007)emotion as another is only the first step. It will not
necessarily reveal the cause of the emotion. If we know
that someone is afraid, we might predict that they will
run, but we cannot predict where they will run unless
we know what they are afraid of. Likewise, covertly
performing the same movement as another is not
sufficient to infer the goals and intentions behind that
movement. Furthermore, as Mitchell et al. (2006)
point out, while the mirror system is ideally suited for
tracking the continually changing states of emotion and
intention of the other, it can tell us nothing about the
stable attitudes and predilections of the other, which
are also important determinants of behaviour.5. THE ROLE OF POSTERIOR SUPERIOR
TEMPORAL SULCUS/TEMPORO-PARIETAL
JUNCTION
Through the resonance of our brain’s mirror system,
we might know that someone is afraid because we are
sharing their experience. But how do we know what
they are afraid of? One way to discover the cause of
their fear is to observe where they are looking. The
region of the brain at the pSTS and the adjacent TPJ is
a prime candidate for this process.
(a) Predicting movement trajectories
This region is activated when participants observe
someone moving their eyes (e.g. Pelphrey et al. 2005)
and this activity is modulated by the context in which the
eye movement occurs. For example, more activity is
elicited in pSTS if the actor moves her eyes away from,
rather than towards, a flashing target (Pelphrey et al.
2004a,b). Similar effects are found when participants
observe someone making reaching movements (Pelphrey
et al. 2004a,b). One possibility is that pSTS is concerned
with predicting the trajectory of movements and that
greater activity is associated with prediction errors, i.e.
when the movement is unexpected. For example, Saxe
et al. (2004) showedparticipants avideo inwhich an actor
walked across a room. On some trials, the actor was
hidden behind a bookcase. When the actor paused
behind the bookcase, so that he emerged later than
expected, greater activity was seen in pSTS.
But is this prediction system dedicated solely to the
prediction of biological movements? Observing two
balls that move in mathematically defined trajectories
with no specifically biological appearance will elicit
activity in pSTS as long as they appear to be interacting
(Schultz et al. 2004, 2005). There is evidence that pSTS
is involved in predicting complex movement trajectories
of any kind (reviewed in Kawawaki et al. 2006). Perhaps
the trajectory to be predicted needs to be complex, but
not specifically biological to elicit activity in pSTS.
(b) Perspective taking
By looking at someone’s eyes, we can discover where
they are looking, but how do we know what they can
see? At the simplest level (level I perspective taking), we
know that someone cannot see what we can see, as their
line of sight is blocked by an obstacle. At a more
complex level (level II perspective taking), we know
that people looking at the same scene from different
angles will arrive at different descriptions of the scene.
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block, while from your point of view, the pole might be
to the left of the block (see Aichhorn et al. (2005) for a
useful review of perspective taking). There have been
few imaging studies of this kind of spatial perspective
taking, with somewhat equivocal results. Zacks et al.
(2003) and Aichhorn et al. (2005) observed activity in
the TPJ when participants had to describe a scene from
another viewer’s perspective. However, such activity
was not observed in the study of Vogeley et al. (2004),
possibly because this study involved level I rather than
level II perspective taking.
Knowing where a fearful person is looking and what
they can see, given their vantage point, enables us to
know what they are looking at and thus identify the cause
of their fear. This ability to see the world from another’s
perspective enables us to realize that other people can
have different knowledge from us and may have false
beliefs about the world, e.g. ‘he thinks he is safe because
he can’t see the bear coming up behind him’. There is
evidence that the TPJ has a critical and more general role
in the performance of tasks that depend upon under-
standing that a person has a false belief about the world
from both imaging (Saxe & Kanwisher 2003) and lesion
studies (Apperly et al. 2004).
Recently, the TPJ (63,K37,20) has been shown to
have a critical role in how we perceive our own body in
space. Abnormal electrical activity in this area in patients
can create out-of-the-bodyexperiences, in which patients
experience looking down at their own body from above.
Furthermore, disruption of activity in this region with
transcranial magnetic stimulation in healthy volunteers
can impair performance of a task which requires the
imagination of one’s own body as if seen from outside
(Blanke et al. 2005). Perspective taking has an important
role in social cognition, but has a role in other domains
also. The ability to imagine one’s body inanother position
in space is important for spatial memory (e.g. Nardini
et al. 2005) as well as for social cognition.6. THE ROLE OF MEDIAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX
Activity in MPFC was observed in the earliest studies
of mentalizing (Fletcher et al. 1995; Goel et al. 1995).
These observations were subsequently confirmed with
a very wide range of tasks, which required participants
to think about mental states (reviewed in Amodio &
Frith 2006).
(a) Is the MPFC really necessary for mentalizing?
There are, however, some unresolved problems for the
interpretation of these results. First, it is not clear
whether this region needs to be intact for successful
performance of mentalizing tasks. On one hand, several
group studies have shown that patients with damage to
prefrontal cortex perform badly on mentalizing tasks
and that this impairment is independent of problems
with traditional executive tasks (Rowe et al. 2001; Stuss
et al. 2001; Gregory et al. 2002). On the other hand,
there is a report of a patient with damage restricted to
MPFC who was not impaired on performance of
mentalizing tasks (Bird et al. 2004). Second, there is an
observation that activation of MPFC is often observed
during rest or low demand tasks in comparison to highPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2007)demand tasks. As a result, while activity may be seen in
MPFC when mentalizing is compared with a control
task (such as reasoning about physical causality), this is
not always the case when mentalizing is contrasted with
rest. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is
that during ‘rest’ or low demand tasks, participants
frequently indulge in mentalizing, thinking, for
example, about why they volunteered to take part in
the study or what might be the real motives of the
experimenter (see Amodio & Frith (2006) for a
discussion of this problem).
(b) Which kinds of task activate MPFC?
At least, three categories of task elicit activity in MPFC
and they are as follows: (i) Mentalizing tasks in which
participants have to understand the behaviour of
characters in terms of their mental states. These tasks
typically involve false beliefs and can be presented as
stories or cartoons (e.g. Gallagher et al. 2000).
However, MPFC is also active when participants
engage in real-time social interactions (e.g. McCabe
et al. 2001) or even when they simply observe social
interactions (Iacoboni et al. 2004). These tasks
presumably involve predicting people’s behaviour in
terms of their current beliefs and intentions. (ii) Person
perception tasks in which participants answer questions
about long-term dispositions and attitudes. These can
be general (e.g. Can people be dependable?—Mitchell
et al. 2002) or specific (e.g. Is your mother talkative?—
Schmitz et al. 2004) and need not apply only to people
(e.g. Can dogs be dependable?—Mitchell et al. 2005).
(iii) Self-perception tasks in which participants answer
questions about their own long-term dispositions (e.g.
Are you talkative?—Kelley et al. 2002) or about their
current feelings (Does this photo make you feel
pleasant?—Ochsner et al. 2004). These three kinds of
task have in common the need to think about mental
states. These can be short-term or long-term mental
states and can be of the self or another.
(c) Location of the mentalizing region
within MPFC
There is little evidence for any systematic differences in
the location of the activity associated with these three
kinds of task. The activity is located in a diffuse region
(paracingulate cortex) on the border of anterior cingulate
cortex (BA 32) and medial prefrontal cortex proper (BA
10). This region has been labelled the ‘emotional’ region
of MPFC and is more anterior and inferior to the region
labelled ‘cognitive’ (Steele & Lawrie 2004). In ana-
tomical terms, it can be labelled anterior rostral MPFC
(Amodio & Frith 2006). A meta-analysis of studies
where activity has been observed in area 10 (Gilbert et al.
2006) shows that activity associated with mentalizing
tasks is medial rather than lateral and is posterior to the
activity associated with multi-task coordination, which is
observed at the frontal pole.
(d) A role for anterior rostral MPFC?
There is, however, strong evidence for a different role for
anterior rostral MPFC in comparison to the adjacent
regions of medial prefrontal cortex. For example, in the
study of Mitchell et al. (2006), participants were told
about two target individuals who were described as
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asked to predict the feelings and attitudes of these two
individuals in various situations (e.g. ‘would he enjoy
having a roommate from a different country?’). The
results show a different pattern when thinking about a
similar or a dissimilar other. Thinking about similar
others was associated with activity in ventral mPFC
(18,57,9: in the region labelled anterior rostral MFC in
Amodio & Frith 2006), while thinking about a dissimilar
other was associated with activity in a more dorsal region
of mPFC (K9,45,42: posterior rostral MFC).
Previous studies had also observed distinctions
between anterior and posterior rostral MPFC. Walter
et al. (2004) asked participants to make inferences
about private intentions (changing a broken light bulb
in order to read a book) in contrast to communicative
intentions (showing someone a map in order to ask the
way). Thinking about communicative intentions acti-
vated a more ventral region (K3,54,15: arMPFC) than
thinking about private intentions. Grezes et al. (2004a)
asked participants to infer whether the movements
associated with the lifting of a box were intended to be
deceptive since the actor was pretending that the box
was heavier than it really was. Movements thought to
be deceptive activated arMPFC (K8,42,20). In
another experiment (Grezes et al. 2004b), the partici-
pants observed movements, which sometimes included
unexpected adjustments, because the box being picked
up was lighter than the actor expected. Observing these
unexpected adjustments was associated with activity in
prMPFC (2,26,52).
These results suggest that arMPFC has a special role
in handling communicative intentions. This is a more
complex process than simply thinking about intentions,
since we have to recognize that the communicator is also
thinking about our mental state. This involves a second-
order representation ofmental state. We have to represent
the communicator’s representation of our mental state.
This is a form of triadic social interaction, such as joint
attention, that Saxe (2006) also associates with dorsal
MPFC. In relation to the observations of Mitchell et al.
(2006), when we think about the mental states of people
with similar attitudes to ourselves, perhaps we automati-
cally think in terms of our shared view of the world.
Such second-order representations are not necessary
when thinking about another person’s private intentions
or their beliefs about the weight of a box. In these
examples, we are simply predicting the outcomes of
actions. Several studies have investigated the prediction
and monitoring processes associated with the selection of
action. Walton et al. (2004) observed activity in the
prMFC when participants monitored the outcome of
actions that were self-selected. Knutson et al. (2005)
reported that the activity in the prMPFC was correlated
with trial-by-trial variations in the anticipated probability
of monetary gain. In research by Coricelli et al. (2005), a
similar region of prMPFC activity was associated with
regret, i.e. discovering that an unselected action
would have led to a better outcome. Finally, Brown &
Braver (2001) reported that prMFC activation was
associated with prediction of the probability of error.
These results all suggest that this region is
concerned with predicting the probable value of
actions of the self. However, the results of EEG studiesPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2007)show that this region is also involved when we observe
the actions of others. A negative event-related potential
component arising from the MPFC is seen not only
when we make an error, but also when we receive
delayed error feedback (Gehring & Willoughby 2002;
Luu et al. 2003) or observe someone else making an
error (van Schie et al. 2004; Bates et al. 2005).
Inferior to the arMPFC is the orbital region. This
region seems to be concerned with feelings rather than
actions, particularly feelings relating to anticipated
rewards and punishments. In monkeys, Padoa-
Schioppa & Assad (2006) have shown that the value
of offered goods is represented in orbital frontal cortex.
In humans, Coricelli et al. (2005) found that activity in
this region (K10,40,K24) was associated with antici-
pated regret. Again, this monitoring of feelings seems to
apply to others as well as the self. Hynes et al. (2006)
asked participants to make inferences about what other
people were thinking (cognitive perspective taking) or
what they were feeling (emotional perspective taking).
Thinking about people’s feelings was associated with
activity in medial orbital cortex (18,63,K7), while
perspective taking in general was associated with
activity in more dorsal regions (2,59,15;K4,60,30).7. THE FUNCTION OF INTELLECT
I have speculated about the role of various components
of the social brain, but in most cases, I believe that these
processes are not specifically social. The exception is
the brain’s mirror system.(a) Accessing the mirror system: the role of
social variables
Activation of the mirror system seems to be a largely
automatic process that is not under conscious control.
But we do not mirror everything that moves and not
everyone receives our empathy. Watching a moving
human arm will interfere with our own movements, but
this interference does not happen when we watch a
moving robot arm (Kilner et al. 2003). This tuning of
the mirror system to purposeful agents rather than
machines is observed in brain activity as well as
behaviour in monkeys and humans (for a review, see
Tai et al. 2004). These results suggest that signals from
an ‘agent detector’ or perhaps a ‘conspecific detector’
are needed to turn on the action mirror system.
In the case of empathy, or mirroring of emotions, the
situation is more complex. How much empathy we show
to conspecifics is modified by our social relationship
with the object of our empathy. We feel less empathy, in
terms of subjective report and brain activity, if someone
who has just treated us unfairly receives pain, especially
if we are male (Singer et al. 2006). We also show
more empathy with the pain of another if we are in eye
contact with them at the moment they receive the pain
(Bavelas et al. 1986). Showing one’s emotion is, in part, a
communicative act (Parkinson 2005) facilitated by the
presence of others. It is not yet known whether the
neural correlates of empathy are also modified by
communicative contact, but, in any case, the function-
ing of our brain’s mirror system is clearly subject to
exquisite modulation by social variables.
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The amygdala is concerned with conditioning,
enabling emotional valence to be associated with an
object. This object may often be a face, but the process
also applies to objects, such as snakes, with no social
connotations. The role of the temporal poles is less well
understood, but here again, while the high-level
concepts and the scripts for different circumstances
instantiated here are of great importance for social
cognition, these forms of knowledge are important for
interacting with the physical as well as the mental world.
I have already suggested that the role of pSTS in
processing biological motion might be a consequence
of a more general role in predicting complex movement
trajectories. While such trajectories are often created by
biological agents, they can have other sources. Like-
wise, if the role of the TPJ is, as I suggest, to compute
different spatial perspectives, then while this is very
useful for social interactions, the process has much
more general applications.
Most speculative and least well specified of all the
suggestions in this essay is the role of anterior rostral
MPFC. In terms of anatomy, there is some evidence that
this region has shown disproportionate expansion in
recent evolution (Semendeferi et al. 2001). The evidence
for phylogenetic expansion of the social brain is discussed
in some detail by Dunbar in this issue (Dunbar & Shultz
2007). In cognitive terms, this region of medial prefrontal
cortex seems to be activated in scenarios involving
communicative intent. Such scenarios involve second-
order representations of mental states, since, to under-
stand your attempt to communicate with me, I have to
represent your representation of my mental state. This
exampleconcerns a high-level social interaction,but such
second-order representations need not have social
content. For example, second-order representations
may have something in common with the higher-order
thoughts that may be necessary for conscious experience
(Rosenthal 2005). However, these are essentially general
purpose operations that can be applied to any domain.(c) The needs of social interaction drive cognition
However, although these mechanisms are not specifically
social, they have been strongly influenced by the needs of
social interactions. Humans are not only much more
sophisticated in their social interactions than other
animals; they are also much cleverer and more inventive
in many domains that are not social, for example in the
use of materials for making novel objects. This is the
critical point that Nick Humphrey (1976) made in his
paper: these cognitive functions have evolved to their high
level because they have been driven by the complexities of
social living. In order to avoid untrustworthy faces, we
need a visual system that can process the subtle visual
features which reveal personality. To discover what
someone is interested in, we need to be able to compute
what someone on the other side of the room can see. We
need to acquire and store the complex scripts that enable
us to behave appropriately at discussion meetings. And,
above all, we need to be able to represent what other
people think about us so that we can use such venues to
enhance all our reputations.Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2007)I am grateful to Uta Frith for discussion and comments. This
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